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A multifaceted approach for an economic pluralism 
 








To date, the dominant economic approaches have downplayed and marginalised the  
role  of  cooperative  and  social  enterprises  in  contemporary  market  economies.  This 
insufficient attention derives from the limited applicability to the case of cooperative 
and  social  enterprises  of  two  of  the  main  assumptions  of  orthodox  microeconomic 
theory: the presence of only self-interested individuals and profit-maximisation as the 
only  possible  firm  objective.  The  mismatch  between  theoretical  assumptions  and 
empirical evidence has led to the underestimation of the growth potential, weight and 
role  of  cooperative  and  social  enterprises.  An  explanation  for  the  persistence  and 
growth  of  these  organisational  types  has  not  been  provided  by  institutional  theory 
either. We thus maintain that the assumptions of the main theoretical models must be 
enlarged  and  deepened  in  order  to  improve  the  scientific  understanding  of 
cooperatives and social enterprises. Individuals as well as institutions can no longer be 
characterised as purely self-interested and profit maximizers. Instead, the importance 
of  motivational  complexity  and  the  diverse  nature  of  preferences  needs  to  be 
introduced  in  the  model  as  suggested  by  the  behavioural  approach.  Diverse 
motivations must be assumed to drive both individual and organisational decisions. 
Furthermore, firms can also be conceived as coordination mechanisms of economic 
activities,  as  suggested  by  the  evolutionary  approach.  To  this  end,  they  develop 
specific  organisational  routines  and  their  objectives  can  be  diverse,  ranging  from 
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Cooperative firms and social enterprises can, despite their differences, be interpreted 
in a unitary way as socially-oriented firms: they are entrepreneurial organisations that 
do not have as their main objective the maximisation of private returns (net surpluses 
or profits) accruing to the investment of capital. Rather, cooperative firms are mutual-
benefit organisations that are usually controlled on an equal voting rights basis not by 
investors, but by different types of patrons (eg. producers, workers, consumers) or by 
a mix of them (multi-stakeholder cooperatives). They are created to protect first and 
foremost their members through the satisfaction of their needs, which can be private 
or social in nature. Social enterprises, as defined by the UK law on the Community 
Interest Company in 2005, and by the Italian law on the Impresa Sociale in 2006, are 
public-benefit organisations that pursue the satisfaction of social needs through the 
imposition of at least a partial non-profit constraint and by devoting the majority of 
their positive residuals and patrimony to socially-oriented activities. Their governance 
structure is similar to that of entrepreneurial non-profit organisations, as analysed by 
the most specialised literature (Weisbrod, 1977, 1988; Hansmann, 1980, 1988, 1996; 
Borzaga and Defourny, 2001).  
 
Research  concerning  cooperatives  and  social  enterprises  is  characterised  by  an 
increasingly  evident  contradiction  between  real  phenomena,  often  confirmed  by 
empirical research, and the contentions put forward, explicitly or otherwise, by the 
predominant  theories.  On  the  one  hand,  increasing  evidence  shows  that  such 
enterprises perform a significant and sometimes growing economic and social role in a 
variety of sectors and in many countries. As importantly, they often achieve economic 
and social outcomes that are better than those achieved by conventional enterprises 
and public institutions. Suffice it to mention, for example, the role played in the past 
twenty years by cooperatives and social enterprises in the production of innovative 
services of general interest, or the results achieved by credit cooperatives during the 
past ten years, and particularly during the recent financial crisis.  
 
On the other hand, the predominant theoretical approaches, primarily in economics, 
tend to underestimate these results and, consequently, the role and potential of this 
set of organisations (Ward, 1958; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1970; Hansmann, 1996). 
The positive role of cooperative and social enterprises is recognised only  in limited 
cases—e.g.,  in  Hansmann‘s  (1996)  work—and  even  when  it  is,  the  theory  assigns 
these organisations a transitional role and relegates their relevance only to contexts 
characterised by severe market imperfections (such as lack of proper regulation and 
sufficient competition) and government failures (e.g. under-provision of public goods).  
 
There are various reasons for this contradiction. First, many studies on cooperatives 
and  social  enterprises  have  been  based  on  approaches  that  were  too  generic  and 
ideological.  For  example,  supporters  of  cooperatives  and  social  enterprises  have 
stressed  solidarity,  altruism  and  reciprocity  as  values  informing  the  work  of  these 
organisations. These values are at the root of their democratic principles, and of the 
socialised  nature  of  the  added  value  they  generate.  However,  values  and  ideology 
alone  cannot  explain  the  increasing  economic  and  social  role  of  cooperatives  and 
social enterprises, or their efficiency and long-term sustainability. They also cannot be 
indistinguishably applied to all forms of cooperative and social enterprises (Borzaga 
and Tortia, 2010). Rather, a suitable interpretative framework is needed in order to 
properly evaluate their nature and their role in modern economic systems. 
  
The underestimation of the role of cooperative and social enterprises has also been 
reinforced by the difficulties in drawing general results from investigations and studies 
that  frequently  consider  only  specific  sectors  or  geographical  areas.  The  lack  of  
shared  objectives  among  researchers  and  specialised  research  institutions  has 
hindered  a  coherent  development  of  a  doctrine  and  empirical  research  on  these 
organisations.  The  predominant  tendency  has  been  to  consider  specific  forms  of 
cooperatives or social enterprises, often starting from highly specific research goals, 
with  few  attempts  having  been  made  to  embed  the  analysis  within  broad  and 
ambitious research designs. This has hampered the development of a general theory 
of these forms of enterprise that could stand comparison with the prevailing economic 
and social paradigms. Moreover, cooperatives and social enterprises are regulated by 
laws that differ greatly among countries, which makes any attempt to give them a 
sufficiently  general  interpretation  (independent  of  national  specificities)  particularly 
complex. 
 
However,  the  main  reason  for  this  undervaluation  seems  to  be  the  difficulty  of 
reconciling the features of these forms of enterprise with the hypotheses, if not the 
value  judgments,  underlying  the  dominant  theories.  In  fact,  the  predominant 
economic, sociological and legal models developed during the 1900s (which underlie 
the institutions on which the modern economic and social systems are based) rely on 
a set of assumptions that include the prevalence of self-interested behaviour and the 
self-regulatory  capacity  of  markets.  These  assumptions  privilege  institutional  forms 
that  are  often  incompatible  with  the  ones  that  characterize  cooperative  and  social 
enterprises. Not surprisingly, then, the dominant theories are unable to explain the 
emergence and evolution of these forms of enterprise and interpret their distinctive 
features.  
 
In light of these considerations, this paper aims to underline the shortcomings of the 
dominant economic approach to the study of cooperative and social enterprises and to 
suggest how some results emerging from the newest economic studies could help to 
deepen  the  understanding  of  the  specific  features  of  these  forms  of  enterprises. 
Section two better explains the need for a re-thinking of the role of cooperative and 
social enterprises in contemporary economies. Section three discusses the limitations 
of traditional economic approaches to the study of these forms of enterprises. Section 
four  suggests  utilizing  new  approaches,  specifically  referring  to  behavioural  and 
evolutionary theory definitions of cooperative and not-self-interested behaviours and 




2. Re-thinking the role of cooperatives and social enterprises 
 
A  growing  body  of  empirical  studies,  conducted  by  researchers  and  national  and 
international institutions in a large number of countries, has documented the evolution 
of cooperative and social enterprises: the increased presence and economic weight of 
cooperatives in some of the sectors in which they have operated for many years, such 
as agriculture and credit; the increasing importance of the general interest services 
sector; and the birth, development and progressive recognition of different forms of 
social enterprise. Moreover, cooperative and social enterprises have proven better able 
than traditional public and private firms to coordinate collective action and to manage 
common pools of resources (Ostrom, 1994). This means that cooperative and social 
enterprises  are  able  to  generate,  motivate  and  govern  the  interaction  of  their 
stakeholders in sharing and pursuing the organisational mission.   
 
The current economic crisis has made a re-thinking of the role of organisations and 
enterprises which pursue goals other than profit-maximization even more necessary 
and  urgent.  Indeed,  it  has  already  stimulated  a  search  for  organisational  and 
economic models that differ from those based on market fundamentalism which have 
predominated in recent decades. For example, financial cooperatives and credit unions 
have  been  recently  recognised  as  intermediaries  that  were  not  involved  or  were 
involved  to  a  significantly  lesser  extent  in  the  credit  crunch  that  brought  financial 
markets  to  the  brink  of  bankruptcy  (Draghi,  2009).  Furthermore,  this  crisis  has 
already made it possible to identify some of the directions in which such a re-thinking 
should move. Influential social scientists are arguing that ―a massive re-thinking of 
the role of the government and of the market is necessary not only to propose large-
scale public intervention in the economy but also to recast the role to date assigned to 
for-profit enterprises‖ Stiglitz (2009). Even more explicitly ―it is necessary to find a 
new balance between markets, governments, and other institutions, including not-for-
profits and cooperatives, with the objective of building a plural economic system with 
several pillars‖. The same thesis has been put forward by other scholars, who usually 
identify cooperative and social enterprises (and in general, the diverse types of not-
for-profit organisations) as constituting one of the four pillars on which solutions to 
the crisis should be based, especially thanks to a renewal of the relationship between 
capital  and  labour  and  to  the  promotion  of  constructive  collaboration  and  trust 
behaviours. To these assertions can be added those of the economic policy-makers, 
who  insist  on  the  need  to  build  a  ―better  world‖  based  on  ―more  ethical  private 
behaviour‖, or on the ―subordination of interests to values‖ developed by ―everybody 
together‖.  
 
These observations highlight an increasingly clear connection among the nature of the 
economic crisis, the need to re-think the workings of the economic and social systems 
constructed during the modern age, and the need to recast the role performed by 
organisations  and  enterprises  pursuing  goals  other  than  profit.  Even  if  it  is  rarely 
stated explicitly, affirming economic pluralism signifies abandoning the preference for 
a  single  type  of  enterprise  –  the  one  driven  by  profit  maximisation  –  and  instead 
asserting  the  value  of  differences.  The  diverse  motivations  and  ideals  on  which 
differences among enterprises are based thus not only emphasize an economic and 
social  importance  hitherto  little  recognized,  if  not  denied,  but  are  also  considered 
resources and conditions for changing institutional and organisational arrangements 
deemed unsatisfactory. 
 
The  re-thinking  of  the  nature,  features,  and  roles  of  the  different  enterprise  types 
entails  a  revision  of  conventional  interpretations  and  consolidated  legal  and 
institutional systems. Stiglitz (2009) states this very clearly in regard to economists 
when he argues that ―We … have focused too long on one particular model, the profit 
maximizing firm, and in particular a variant of that model, the unfettered market. We 
have seen that that model does not work, and it  is clear that  we need alternative 
models. We need also to do more to identify the contribution that these alternative 
forms of organisation are making to our society, and when I say that, the contribution 
is not just a contribution to GDP, but a contribution to satisfaction‖. But this invitation 
applies  to  all  social  scientists.  It  applies,  for  example,  to  the  sociologists  whose 
research  on social  capital  and  local  development  has  failed  to  consider  the  role  of 
cooperatives as amongst the main collectors and enforcers of trust relations; or to the 
political  scientists  who  have  generally  underestimated  the  contribution  that  these 
organisational and entrepreneurial forms may make to the workings of democracy in 
producing social inclusion and a more effective implementation of participatory rights.  
 
These  arguments  suggest  clear  directions  for  future  economic  and  social  research. 
Specification  is  required  regarding  how  cooperative  and  social  enterprises  can 
contribute to the creation of this ―better world‖. For example, closer examination of 
their features of governance and control, working rules and distributive patterns best 
suited  to  their  operation  is  needed.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  single  out  the 
limitations of the standard economic approaches and to define a new approach that 
can  overcome  these  limitations.  This  approach  assumes  that  efficiency  of 
organisations (similarly to that of countries) must be enlarged from the evaluation of 
only private benefits to also mutual-benefits and public benefits. 
 
 
3. The prevalent economic approaches and their limits 
 
Elaborating new interpretive and analytical frameworks that can provide an effective 
understanding  of  cooperative  and  social  enterprises,  also  in  terms  of  policy 
implications, requires starting from traditional approaches to the study of economics. 
In this section we will examine the most orthodox approaches, i.e. the neoclassical 
and the new-institutionalist, which have dealt with cooperative and social enterprises. 
 
3.1. The orthodox approaches 
 
The 1900s were dominated by the idea that the best way to organize the production 
of goods and services so that general development and well-being could be obtained 
in the most efficient way was to allocate this task to two sole actors: the market and 
the state. The former – understood in highly restrictive terms as the set of competing 
for-profit firms – was entrusted with the production of the greatest possible quantity 
of private goods and services. The task of the latter was instead the production of 
public and collective goods, and the promotion of economic growth and development 
through the attainment of minimum income levels for the entire population. The state 
is thus recognised as having both a distributive and a re-distributive function. To this 
end, it was argued, markets should be made as competitive as possible, and public 
intervention  should  be  managed  democratically,  so  that  the  most  important 
unsatisfied needs could be identified and the interventions necessary to satisfy them 
organized.  Thus  eliminated,  at  least  in  theory,  was  both  the  necessity  and  the 
usefulness of all those other actors – the community, the family, cooperatives, social 
enterprises, and other private non-profit organisations – inspired by the principles of 
mutuality or solidarity and widespread until the beginning of the 1900s. Indeed, it was 
alleged, these institutions were likely to become sources of inefficiency. According to 
this theory, they should therefore be progressively replaced with for-profit firms or 
public  institutions.  The  growing  pressure  observed in  the  last  decades  towards  the 
enlargement of markets in the globalised economy and at the same time more and 
more binding financial constraints forcing the reduction of the role of the state in the 
economy, are testimony to this process.  
 
In  a  similar  fashion,  the  concept  of  efficiency  has  been  given  to  date  an  overly 
restrictive  meaning.  It  has  been  understood  as  a  purely  technical  concept  mainly 
referring to the employed technologies and the optimal mix of inputs. The relevance of 
organisational efficiency has been underestimated by the inherited theories, with the 
notable  exception  of  the  concept  of  X-efficiency  (Leibenstein,  1966).  This  is  so 
because  the  most  relevant  concepts  of  efficiency  took  into  consideration  only  the 
technical  aspects  of  efficiency,  while  other  aspects,  such  as  the  intrinsic  and  non-
monetary motivations of the involved actors, and a broadly defined idea of well-being  
were disregarded or marginalised. For example, the comparative analysis of different 
organisational  and  ownership  forms  has  not  been  adequately  developed. 
Consequently, objectives other than the maximisation of profit have been completely 
excluded  from  economic  analysis.  These  reductive  point  of  views  have  halted  the 
explanatory potential even of the best known theories, which have not been able to 
give an adequate account of important phenomena, for example the growing socio-
economic weight of non-profit organisations and social enterprises that often operate 
without  supplying  their  stakeholders  highly-powered  monetary  incentives.  A  more 
comprehensive  theoretical  framework  should  instead  be  able  to  properly  take  into 
account  all  of  these  elements:  technological  and  financial  factors,  but  also  a  rich 
variety of motivational drives, expressed preferences, and a general concept of well-
being. 
 
The  distinction  between  the  efficiency  role  of  for-profit  organisations  and  the 
distributive function of public agencies has therefore come to be exposed to various 
doubts  about  its  sustainability.  As  a  consequence,  growing  shortcomings  in  the 
prevailing economic and social models have been revealed, especially in recent years. 
Incomes increased in only some countries, under this model and such increases were 
not redistributed either among countries or among the citizens of the same country. 
And the model failed to do so even to the minimum extent necessary to eliminate the 
most acute forms of poverty: indeed, income inequalities have markedly increased in 
recent decades. Moreover, despite a constant increase in public spending, the supply 
of services of collective interest became more and more unsatisfactory in quantity and 
quality,  leaving  an  increasingly  large  part  of  needs  unsatisfied.  The  weakening  of 
social  bonds  brought  about  by  an  excessive  emphasis  on  self-interested  and 
competitive  behaviour  has  heightened  the  sense  of  vulnerability  and  fears  for  the 
future, and it has diminished trust relations and cooperative behaviours. Over the last 
decades, increased economic well-being in the richest countries has not been matched 
by  increased  happiness  (Easterlin,  2001,  2005).  The  various  attempts  made  to 
remedy the shortcomings of this model by re-allocating responsibilities for managing 
certain social activities to one or the other of the two actors, through, for example, 
the privatization policies adopted in recent decades, have not achieved the hoped-for 
results. This is borne out by the current economic crisis, which shows how difficult it is 
to  obtain  –  solely  through  the  constraints  imposed  by  market  competition  and 
regulation  –  socially  responsible  behaviour  from  agents  concerned  only  with  the 
maximization  of  private  returns  informed  by  self-interest,  and  how  costly  it  is  to 
compensate for the damage caused by such behaviour. In many instances, such as 
the  exclusion  from  the  labour  market  of  less  able  workers,  costs  can  overcome 
benefits, leading to the production of dead weight social losses.  
 
The  inability  of  the  dominant  economic  and  social  model  to  respond  to  numerous 
needs has, among other things, created new space for the development of socially-
oriented  entrepreneurial  organisations  created  by  groups  of  citizens  and  civil 
movements. In fact, in the past two decades, contrary to every forecast, and often in 
contrast with the prevailing culture and with the legislation in force, cooperatives and 
social enterprises have spread, evolved, and strengthened in many countries (Borzaga 
and  Spears,  2004;  Borzaga,  Defourny,  2001). This  evolution and  recovered role  of 
cooperative  and  social  enterprises  cannot  be  explained  by  the  traditional  theories. 
New approaches are needed.  
 
3.2. New institutionalism 
  
A way to cope with the assumption of only profit-maximizing organisations has been 
developed  by  institutional  theory.  New  institutionalism  tends  to  move  away  from  a 
view of the firm centred solely on the profit maximization hypothesis, since the core of 
the  analysis  is  cast  in  terms  of  cost  minimisation,  which  represent  the  relevant 
efficiency  criteria.  The  ability  to  minimise  transaction  costs  singles  out  the 
organisations  that  have  the  greatest  survival  and  expansion  potential.  Transaction 
costs represent a concept that has been used by many authors in this research stream 
starting from Coase (1937) and reaches its most mature elaboration in Hansmann‘s 
(1996) model. This way, the role of institutions, in terms of control rights, governance 
and organisational routines, takes centre stage, and it is not marginalised any longer 
as  in  the  neo-classical  approach.  New-institutionalism  emphasizes  the  role  of 
coordination  mechanisms,  such  as  markets  and  hierarchies  (Williamson,  1975)  in 
solving collective problems in the production of goods or services.  
 
Moreover, the new-institutionalist model fosters the understanding of the process of 
creation and diffusion of cooperatives, social enterprises and non-profit organisations 
by asserting that the organisations surviving on the market are those able to minimize 
the sum total of costs connected with their operation (Hansmann, 1996). Transaction 
costs are sorted into the costs of the use of the market and ownership costs. The 
former are undergone by the non-controlling stakeholders that interact with the firm 
by  means  of  contracted  transactions,  while  the  latter  are  undergone  by  the  firm‘s 
owners. The costs linked with the operation of the market concern market power ex-
ante  (monopoly  and  monopsony),  market  power  ex-post  (lock-in)  and  asymmetric 
information. The costs of ownership are those linked with decisional processes, risk 
taking  by  entrepreneurs,  and  agency  relationships,  with  the  consequent  costs  of 
control of employees and managers.  
 
The  main  advantage  of  cooperative  and  social  enterprises  is  to  reduce  transaction 
costs  in  the  presence  of  market  imperfections,  for  example  market  power,  which 
favours  the  creation  of  worker  and  consumer  cooperatives,  and/or  of  asymmetric 
information,  which  favours  the  creation  of  non-profit  organisations  and  social 
enterprises  (Hansmann,  1996;  Borzaga  and  Tortia,  2010).
2  The  new-institutional 
theory has the merit to propose a new conception of the private . It  enlarges  the 
opportunity for private organisations to also   produce  public and collective-interest 
goods,
3  and  it  supports  a  positive,  though  limited  role  for  mutual -benefit 
organisations. New institutionalism also enables  a  re-thinking of the most relevant 
institutional features of non-profit oriented firms, most notably the profit distribution 
constraint  and  innovative  forms  of  governance.  Furthermore,  the  approach  helps 
explain the origins of the cooperative and social enterprises movement by evidencing 
the higher efficiency of these organisations in contexts characterised by the existence 
of market power and pronounced asymmetric information.  
 
The  Hansmann  model  also  identifies  some  shortcomings  in  the  cooperative  firm, 
represented primarily by higher collective dec ision-making costs, especially as firm 
dimension grows and its members, for example workers or borrowers, get more 
differentiated in terms of expressed preferences and endowments of financial wealth 
or  human  capital.  These  factors  cause  different  members  t o  develop  different 
objectives,  leading  to inflated decision -making costs and  organisational  impasses. 
These limitations are very apparent in the case of big industrial firms, while they can 
                                                 
2 Of course, the efficiency of cooperative and social enterprises is also driven by ccompetitive pressure on the market, which 
pushes these organisations to reduce costs, thereby increasing efficiency. 
3 The assignment of the 2010 Nobel Prize for Economics to Elinor Olstrom stands as an evident recognition of the relevance 
of this new school of thought.  
be overcome in small organisations in which members have homogeneous features, 
such  as  small  cooperatives  of  producers  and  professional  partnerships.  Not  all 
typologies of cooperatives suffer this limitation in the same way, but the problem is 
relevant  any  time  members‘  interests  are  not  highly  homogeneous.  In  the  case  of 
non-profit organisations and social enterprises, the main shortcomings are recognized 
instead  in  the  difficulty  of  gathering  sufficient  risk  capital  and  offering  adequate 
incentives  to  their  stakeholders,  leading  to  a  reduced  efficiency  of  the  production 
process.  
 
Overall, new institutionalism gives a relevant, but reductive picture of socially-oriented 
firms in market economies. While it is able to deal with and explain the existence of all 
entrepreneurial  forms,  and  hence  also  of  cooperative  and  social  enterprises,  it 
undergoes  serious  shortcomings,  which  can  be  summarized  as:  1.  the 
underestimation of the role of governance changes in fixing the problems generating 
higher  ownership  costs;  2.  a  conception  of  the  firm  exclusively  based  on  cost-
minimization; 3. the assumption of the exclusively self-interested individual; 4. the 
neglect of the social role of cooperatives, of social enterprises and of their institutional 
peculiarities. In more general terms, the lack of recognition of the role of cooperative 
and social enterprises in the solution of social dilemmas, which for-profit firms and 
public agencies are not able to cope with, depends crucially on the too restrictive and 
unrealistic  assumption  that  cooperative  and  social  enterprises  and  the  main  actors 
inside  them  behave  in  an  exclusively  self-interested  way,  pursuing  exclusively  the 
private benefit of members. This assumption needs to be widened to account for the 
presence of social preferences (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002), 
as well as of intrinsic motivations linked to reciprocity and other-regarding objectives. 
 
3.3 A conclusion on the shortcomings of the prevalent economic approaches 
 
In  order  to  explain  why  cooperative  and  social  enterprises  can  be  efficient 
organisations, we must overcome the abovementioned shortcomings in the traditional 
notion of efficiency. The mere recognition of the shortcomings of the dominant social 
and economic models and the renewed vitality of cooperatives and social enterprises 
is  not  enough  to  foresee  their  future  evolution.  Identifying  possible  new  equilibria 
among different organisational forms necessarily requires a re-thinking of the ideas 
and the theories hitherto predominant, starting from the concept of efficiency, and 
from  the  ability  of  cooperative  and  social  enterprises  to  satisfy  private  and  social 
needs (Borzaga and Tortia, 2006, 2007, 2010).  Consistently, it is necessary to single 
out  new  and  more  advanced  efficiency  indicators  that  are  able  to  consider  the 
relevance of motivations, work effort and their results in terms of product quality. This 
endeavour  is  worth  pursuing  since,  for  example,  recent  theoretical  and  empirical 
results show a clear positive connection between intrinsic and pro-social motivations 
on the one hand, and work effort and productive efficiency on the other. 
 
 
4. The potential of new theoretical contributions 
 
Various  new  theoretical  and  methodological  streams  in  economic  research  make  it 
possible  not  only  to  explain  the  recent  strengthening  of  cooperative  and  social 
enterprises, but also to argue that they could perform a much greater role than what 
has been granted to them by economics to date, thus contributing to the design of a 
different and better economic and social system. This section is devoted to giving a 
general  outline  of  those  scientific  developments  which  seem  most  relevant  to  the 
analysis of the economic and social role of cooperatives and social enterprises.  
 
The  main  assumption  of  this  new  approach  is  that  the  conventional  interpretative 
paradigm, but also the neo-institutional approach are – at least partially – insufficient 
and  new  interpretations  of  organisational  behaviour  and  coordination  must  be 
proposed.  Two  main  theoretical  streams  can  be  singled  out  and  involved  in  the 
analysis:  behavioural  economics,  which  analyses  individual  behaviours,  and 
evolutionary economics, which introduces the idea of organisations as problem solvers 
and explains the way in which organisational routines and economic systems change 
over time. 
 
4.1. Behavioural economics 
 
Analyses of individual behaviour carried out by the behavioural school question the 
hypothesis  that  every  human  action,  and  especially  every  economic  action,  is 
governed exclusively by self-interest. Behavioural economics  maintains instead that 
human actions spring from a mix of motivations and preferences.  
 
The  behavioural  economics  approach  was  first  inspired  by  developments  in  social 
psychology  (e.g.,  DeCharms,  1968;  Deci,  1975),  which  took  into  consideration  the 
relevance of intrinsic and non-monetary motivations. Then it sprang in economics in 
connection with the doctrine of limited rationality (Simon, 1979) and decision-making 
under  risk  (Khaneman  and  Tversky,  1979).  Frey  (1997)  evidenced  the  interplay 
between intrinsic motivations and extrinsic incentives envisaging a possible effect of 
crowing out of the former by the latter when monetary and other extrinsic incentives 
displace self-determined choices informed by intrinsic motivations. For these authors, 
extrinsic  and  intrinsic  motivations  drive  individual  behaviour  through  external 
compensations or through individual interest and personal satisfaction in carrying out 
an activity. While in the former case we should assume that only economic incentives 
increase individual wellbeing and explain economic actions, intrinsic motivations allow 
for  a  broader  analysis,  also  explaining  the  willingness  of  individuals  to  cooperate, 
relate  with  other  people,  and  support  development  objectives  that  benefit  other 
people as well. Hence, it is possible to maintain that motivations are multifaceted, and 
people  are  moved  simultaneously  by  self-interested,  other-regarding  and  process-
regarding preferences (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998). 
 
The continuum of motivations characterising economic agents is described by the self 
determination theory of Gagnè and Deci (2005), who assert that people progressively 
internalise in their objectives some rules of behaviour which at the beginning come 
from  outside  (so  called  externally  regulated  behaviour,  which  includes  economic 
incentives, authority, and control) and which over time are transformed into individual 
ethical rules and then into individual aims (so called introjected regulation, identified 
regulation  and  integrated  regulation).  People‘s  willingness  to  cooperate  in 
interpersonal interaction can derive from economic convenience or imposition, from 
social  norms  on  which  the  individual  is  morally  obliged  to  adhere,  or  from  a  real 
community of interest of people. The behavioural economics approach, informed by 
self-determination  theory,  focuses  on  the  non-instrumental  aspects  of  human 
behaviour  and  on  an  organisation  of  work  that  stresses  reciprocity  and  non-
hierarchical  relations.  It  helps  us  understand  that  in  cooperatives  and  social 
enterprises, the sharing of values and common aims should prevail. Members‘ and 
stakeholders‘  behaviours  are  not  only  dictated  by  financial  and  other  monetary 
variables,  but  instead  reflect  primarily  their  social  and  moral  norms,  and  intrinsic 
interests, which need to be correctly coordinated with extrinsic incentives and self-
interested preferences.  
 
Behavioural economics introduces social preferences as crucial drives of behaviours. 
Social  preferences  include  behaviours  that  are  not-self-interested  since  people  can 
make decisions that are driven by interest for the wellbeing of others (altruism), by a 
general inclination to reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter, 2000) and by a quest for justice 
and  equity  (Fehr  and  Schmidt,  2001;  Tyler  and  Blader,  2000).  In  order  to  explain 
cooperative  and  social  enterprises,  some  theoretical  approaches  have  assigned 
particular  attention  to  the  notion  of  reciprocity  (e.g.,  Zamagni,  2005)  and  to  the 
notion of donation and altruism (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). On the other hand, empirical 
findings have maintained that workers in non-profit organisations are more attentive 
to  intrinsic  motivations,  relations,  and  other-regarding  preferences  (Preston,  1989; 
Borzaga and Depedri, 2005; Borzaga and Tortia, 2006). These behaviours are quite 
aligned with the cooperative principles, and especially with: the democratic rules that 
enforce  procedural  and  distributive  fairness;  autonomy  and  independence,  which 
support  intrinsic  motivations;  cooperative  education,  which  enhances  the 
internalization  of  the  organisational  mission  in  the  stakeholders‘  aims  and  the 
conformism  to  collective  social  norms;  the  interest  of  members,  which  requires 
solidarity and not-self-interested aims; the interest for the community, which enforces 
altruism.  Procedural  fairness  represents  one  of  the  main  organisational  results  in 
terms  of  formation  and  evolution  of  organisational  routines  that  allows  the  actors 
involved to conform to common and recognised norms of behaviour (Sacconi, 2000; 
Tortia, 2008). The stress put on the sharing of values—instead of hierarchy, control 
mechanisms and monetary incentives —should result in increased satisfaction, effort, 
and  loyalty  to  the  organisation.  These  results  are  considered  over  and  above  cost 
reduction connected with the less intense utilisation of monetary incentives and with 
lower control costs.  
 
Thus behavioural economics makes it possible to include in economic analysis, and 
hence  to  valorise  in  economic  terms  as  well,  behavioural  propensities  and 
organisational  models  which  to  date  have  been  neglected  and  considered  of  little 
interest, but which instead are commonplace in cooperatives and social enterprises. 
 
However,  approaching  cooperative  and  social  enterprises  by  looking  only  at  social 
preferences (mainly altruism and reciprocity) is as limiting as considering only self-
interested  aims.  Rather,  a  mix  of  incentives  and  motivations  driving  people‘s  and 
organisational behaviours must be considered (Borzaga and Mittone, 1997; Bacchiega 
and Borzaga, 2001, 2003). Future research will have to answer the question of how 
different  kinds  of  individual  motivations,  preferences  and  incentives  interact  and 
inform  organisational  behaviour,  and  of  how  governance  rules  in  different 
organisational forms can influence individual preferences and choice.  
 
4.3. The evolutionary theory 
 
The  second  approach  that  we  suggest  considering  when  analyzing  cooperative  and 
social  enterprises  is  evolutionary  theory.  The  first  reason  why  the  evolutionary 
doctrine is crucial for the understanding of the emergence, development and change 
of cooperative and social enterprises is that it focuses on the emergence and change 
of  organisational  routines,  and  on  institutional  evolution.  Cooperatives  and  social 
enterprises  can  be  considered  organisational  forms  that  have  been  created  by 
developing and implementing innovative organisational routines. The study of these 
routines,  both  in  terms  of  economic  analysis  and  in  an  historical  perspective 
represents  one  of  the  most  crucial  elements  for  the  understanding  of  these 
enterprises.  Second,  the  evolutionary  doctrine  does  not  focus  on  mere  cost- 
minimization, but on the production of surplus directed to the satisfaction of relevant 
private and social needs. The production of an economic and social surplus is the main 
driver  of  economic  activity  and  of  its  change,  and  does  not  amount  either  to  the 
production  of  the  profit,  nor  to  its  maximization.  One  consequence  is  that  the 
production of an increased surplus does not entail or require cost minimization, as the 
standard microeconomic approaches maintain. Higher costs can be a viable solution if 
the  surplus  allows  the  organisation  to  survive  and  expand  anyway.  However,  the 
surplus need not be characterized exclusively by private economic returns, but can 
well have a collective and social connotation.  
 
The approach has therefore many interesting implications, for example in dealing with 
the role of the firm in local development (Granovetter, 1985) and in the understanding 
of the emergence of multi-stakeholder governance forms. The embeddedness of the 
organisation at the local level is crucial since knowledge and resources (both physical 
and human) present at the local level always represent the core of the firm‘s operative 
capacity. This is all the more true in the case of cooperative and social enterprises, 
whose members are necessarily located and embedded at the local level, expressing 
needs that are usually shared by many other subjects in the locality. Multi-stakeholder 
governance is therefore an emergent feature of cooperative and social enterprises and 
needs  to  be  carefully  considered  when  analyzing  their  role  in  socio-economic 
development (Borzaga and Tortia, 2009). Moreover, by considering the production of 
surplus  as  the  main  objective  of  economic  activities,  the  evolutionary  approach 
broadens  the  evaluation  of  the  efficiency  of  organisations,  also  taking  into 
consideration  the  externalities  produced  at  both  the  micro  and  macro  levels,  for 
example, respectively, on the well-being of stakeholders and on employment. 
 
The evolutionary doctrine is compatible with a conception of the firm not as a mere 
maximizer of the net returns accruing to their investment programmes, but, rather, as 
a coordinating device geared toward satisfying needs that can be private and material, 
but also collective and psychological. Furthermore, as a rule, firms do not operate in 
perfect markets and this forecloses the possibility  of obtaining the maximization of 
social  welfare  by  means  of  perfect  competition  among  price-taking,  atomistic 
organisations. Instead, organisational routines have evolved and continue to evolve to 
allow  different  subjects  to  come  together  and  pursue  production  objectives  in 
entrepreneurial  ventures  (Nelson  and  Winter,  1982)  with  the  aim  of  enjoying  the 
results (the surplus) in economic and monetary, but also in social and psychological, 
terms. This way the metaphysical shortcomings highlighted in the previous sections 
and linked to the ex-ante assumption of self-seeking preferences are avoided since 
nothing  in this definition  of the firm requires  individuals within  organisations to be 
only and fully self-interested and the social aspect of the operation of firms can be as 
crucial as their economic objectives.  
 
The  potential  of  the  evolutionary  approach  for  developing  a  more  realistic  and 
scientifically  relevant  understanding  of  human  agency  is  supported  by  various 
elements. To start with, many results coming from the study of group selection clearly 
show  that  altruism  and  pro-social  attitudes  can  be  functional  in  increasing  the 
reproductive success of individuals, organisations, communities and society at large 
(Hodgson, 1993; Bowles, 1998, 2004) by boosting sympathy, trust and the sense of 
community. Here it is clear that the evolutionary approach and the behavioural one 
are complementary in the understanding of human agency and social evolution. This 
is  so  because,  in  order  to  take  into  account  also  collective  and  social  objectives, 
individuals  need  to  be  characterized  by  motivational  complexity  and  interact  in  a 
suitable institutional environment supporting non self-regarding attitudes. Applied to  
cooperative and social enterprises, the approach seems to maintain that members can 
share  an  organisational  mission  which  differs  from  both  profit  maximization  and 
individual wellbeing. It is instead guided by common objectives and by cooperative 
intentions.  Similar  motivations  can  also  explain  customer  choices,  when  clients  of 
cooperative  and  social  enterprise  choose  goods  and  services  because  of  sympathy, 
trust, and sense of community, which relate them with the organisation. Furthermore, 
in the case of workers, a high monetary remuneration may not be able to displace the 
negative  effect  of  the  perception  of  an  unfair  work-environment.  On  the  contrary, 
workers can agree to cooperate and increase effort because they share the mission of 
their firm and seek involvement in the organisational processes (Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000). 
 
Second, since the focus of evolutionary theory is on institutions, which take the form 
of  property  rights,  governance  structures  and  organisational  models  (Williamson, 
2000) and on their evolution, preferences are clearly endogenous because different 
cultural  contexts  and  institutions  exert  a  relevant  differential  impact  on  individual 
behaviour, even when the social problems to be solved have exactly the same nature 
(Bowles, 1998, 2004). For example, the importance of working in a fair environment, 
where decisional processes are transparent versus working in a hierarchical system in 
which  the  motivations  lying  behind  the  decisions  made  by  superiors  are  never 
disclosed. Hence the understanding of individual behaviour cannot be defined ex ante 
on the basis of some general criteria, but has to be assessed empirically by identifying 
the  relevance  of  the  interaction  between  the  individual  and  the  institutional 
environment. This implies that the emergence of cooperative and social enterprises 
and  their  increasing  role  must  be  analyzed  within  the  embedding  social  and 
institutional  domain  and  by  testing  the  possible  interaction  with  the  local  demand, 
with  the  local  social  capital,  with  the  political  system,  and  with  anthropological 
dimensions  also  linked  to  the  local  culture.  Such  dimensions  directly  influence  the 
emergence  of  new  institutions  answering  to  unsatisfied  needs  or  to  cultural 
movements; they explain the enforcement of institutions supported by law and the 
increasing number of cooperative and social enterprises in regions characterized by a 
high level of social capital. Furthermore, if the socio-economic context relates to the 
development of cooperative and social enterprises, differences among countries do not 
limit the relevance of sectoral or territorial research, but instead reveal the importance 
of  the  differences  in  the  diffusion  and  characteristics  of  cooperative  and  social 
enterprises,  since  they  highlight  the  ever  growing  differentiation  between  different 
national and local contexts, leading to increased institutional richness. 
 
4.4. Combining the different approaches 
 
Given the foregoing arguments, a new scientific project for a better and more correct 
understanding of the economic and social nature and objectives of cooperative and 
social enterprises needs to take into consideration at least three crucial elements: 
 
  A reinterpretation of the problems linked to the relations between market and 
hierarchies (Williamson, 1975) since  in this new approach market exchanges 
are by no means equivalent to the spread of profit maximising firms. Indeed, a 
plurality of entrepreneurial forms – private-benefit, mutual-benefit, and social 
benefit – can be envisaged on the market. Furthermore, when public-benefit 
entrepreneurial  forms  are  considered,  the  mediating  role  of  the  government 
should also be taken into consideration; 
  
  The definition of a wider concept of enterprises, which is not restricted to the 
narrow focus on profit maximization and cost minimisation inherited from the 
most  orthodox  approaches.  It  needs  to  define  firms  broadly  as  coordinating 
devices of economic activity, whose main or sole objective is the satisfaction of 
private and social needs. This is affected through the management of common 
pools  of  resources  (Ostrom,  1994),  which  requires  the  implementation  of 
proper governance and working rules, or organisational routines; 
 
  The  consideration  of  a  wide  variety  of  economic  actors  –  investors,  donors, 
managers, workers, volunteers, customers, users, beneficiaries, and the local 
community – who are driven by a plurality of motivational drives, intrinsic and 
extrinsic,  monetary  and  non-monetary,  and  express  different  preferences, 
which can be self-regarding, but also other regarding or informed by criteria of 
reciprocity (Zamagni and Sacco, 2002). Behavioural, experimental, and neuro 
economics  become  crucial  tools  of  analysis  for  understating  the  complex 
interaction between all these different behavioural propensities.     
 
The need to explain self-interest together with social preferences, efficiency together 
with effectiveness and social wellbeing, transaction costs together with social effects, 
requires  a  combination  of  the  above-described  theories.  If  the  objective  of  the 
enterprise is, or can be, also the solution of collective action problems in the presence 
of scarce resources and of a relevant degree of non-excludability (Ostrom, 1994), and 
if  the  motivations  at  the  basis  of  economic  behaviour  do  not  concern  obtaining 
personal benefits alone, it is possible to argue that the relations among agents inside 
and outside the enterprise may be not only or not necessarily competitive but also, 
and  in  some  cases  mainly,  cooperative.  Moreover,  such  cooperation,  even  when 
partial, may enable the enterprise not only to pursue common interests, but also to 
obtain  the  resources  necessary  for  that  purpose.  It  is  thus  possible  to  explain 
cooperative  and  social  enterprises  in  a  manner  different  from  what  has  been 
attempted  in  the  past,  and  to  understand  their  modes  of  operation  and  socio-
economic role.  
 
At the same time, it is possible to reconsider fundamental economic concepts such as 
efficiency. Theoretical and empirical results show a clear positive connection between 
intrinsic and pro-social motivations, on the one hand, and effort and productivity on 
the other (Bacchetti, Castriota and Tortia, 2009). Consistently, it is necessary to single 
out  new  and  more  advanced  efficiency  indicators  that  are  able  to  consider  the 
relevance  of  satisfaction,  motivations,  work  effort,  and  their  results  in  terms  of 
product quality. 
 
These considerations do not reject the results hitherto obtained by economic analysis; 
in particular they do not gainsay the role of the market and the for-profit firm. More 
simply, they propose a more pluralist economic system than the present one, which is 
characterized by competition among similar enterprises. In the new perspective, the 
idea of competition is extended to enterprises differing in their objectives, ownership 
forms, governance systems, and organisational models. 
 
4.5. Other non-economic aspects of the new approach 
 
The  economic  theory  of  cooperative  and  social  enterprises  is  supported  by  the 
increasing  attention  paid  by  the  political  and  legal  sciences  to  the  theme  of 
subsidiarity.  Application  of  this  concept,  especially  in  its  horizontal  sense,  yields 
innovative models of socio-economic organisation more open than traditional ones to  
the  direct  contribution of private  actors  in  defining  and  pursuing  collective  interest 
directly, and not just through delegation. Thus created are new spaces for the direct 
commitment  of  individual  and  organized  actors,  also  in  the  form  of  firms,  where 
cooperatives and social enterprises are more effective than public agencies and for-
profit firms. The affirmation of the subsidiarity principle also changes the way in which 
a  community  forms  its  ―social  preference  function‖,  i.e.  its  desired  combination 
between  the  supply  of  goods  and  services  and  the  distribution  of  income.  The 
approach predominant to date has considered the formation of the social preference 
function to be the exclusive task of governments. But according to the subsidiarity 
principle, it should instead derive from the joint action of public and private subjects 
concurring in its formation with their decisions about how much, and especially what, 
to  produce,  and  how  to  allocate  and  therefore  distribute  resources.  There  thus 
emerges a new understanding of democracy in general which also comprises forms of 
economic democracy, while re-valuing the role of democratically created and managed 
enterprises. These become places not only of production, but also of the expression 
and  formation  of  social  preferences.  For  example,  the  bottom-up  formation  of 
development objectives by the same actors that will benefit from the results of the 
same development patterns becomes possible when cooperative and social enterprises 
are  locally  embedded  (Borzaga  and  Tortia,  2009;  Sacchetti  and  Sugden,  2009). 
Finally, along these same lines is the increasing insistence of social scientists on the 
importance  of  social  capital  as  a  factor  in  both  social  cohesion  and  economic 
development. In this case, too, special significance is acquired by all the institutions 
and  organisational  forms  that  are  able  to  contribute  to  the  strengthening  of  trust 
relations and to the accumulation of social capital, such as cooperatives and social 
enterprises. For the development of the social sciences in general, the development of 
cooperative and social enterprises offers a unique occasion to study social contexts in 
which, at least in principle, social capital in terms of trust relations can be produced 
and accumulated.  
 
The preceding examples are only some of the theoretical developments useful for an 
innovative interpretation of cooperative and social enterprises. However, for the time 
being, they seem sufficient to develop a new interpretation of these entrepreneurial 
forms with which their economic and social role can be appraised more realistically, 
and  which  can  be  used  to  identify  coherent  policy  strategies.  Furthermore,  the 
highlighted  theoretical  developments  provide  the  ability  to  explain why  cooperative 
and social enterprises show high adaptive potential and are resilient to socio-economic 
change: their ability to answer to inefficiencies of other institutions and to local needs, 
the economic advantages generated by their principles for their members, users and 
beneficiaries,  their  ability  to  increase  the  production  of  positive  externalities,  their 
contribution to valorise local resources and local economic activities, the diffusion of 
culture, social norms and social capital. 
 
 
5. Final remarks and suggestions 
 
In order to re-think the role of cooperative and social enterprises so that they can 
respond  innovatively  and  adequately  to  the  needs  highlighted  by  the  foregoing 
discussion, the first step to be taken is to reverse the research strategy which to date 
has inspired most of the scientific reflections on these topics. Instead of interpreting 
these organisational and entrepreneurial forms and their economic and social role by 
means  of  models  developed  for  other  purposes,  and  therefore  generally  based  on 
hypotheses  incompatible  with  their  specific  features,  priority  should  be  given  to 
constructing models and theories consistent with the principles and values that have  
long determined the activities of these enterprises. The scientific project which derives 
from this logical reversal must necessarily start from a view of economic systems as 
entities  based  on  organisational  variety  where  differentiated  goals  are  found  and 
competition is as possible as collaborative relations when objectives coincide. These 
new theories and interpretative models need to identify the factors which have led to 
the formation of the different forms of enterprise (particularly of mutual-benefit and 
public-benefit forms), the motivations and values that condition their action, and the 
system  of  incentives  that  they  activate  (also  through  definition  of  distinctive 
governance and control models) in order to aggregate human and material resources 
around the activities undertaken and the goals pursued. Among the main objectives of 
this scientific endeavour should be the identification of the conditions which ensure or 
prevent  long-term  sustainability,  and  the  understanding  of  the  specific  contribution 
that  cooperative  and  social  enterprises  can  make  to  economic  and  human 
development.  
 
The philosophy underlying this scientific attempt needs to be based on the overcoming 
of  the  narrow  focus  of  past  theories  and  empirical  research.  To  do  this,  it  will  be 
necessary to integrate the existing theories in practice with an organic approach by 
overcoming the traditional concept of efficiency and by looking not only at the ability 
of  the  organisation  to  survive  on  the  market  and  to  become  competitive  (and 
therefore  efficient),  but  also  at  the  organization‘s  contribution  to  economic 
development  and  to  the  creation  of  a  welfare  mix  directed  to  the  satisfaction  of 
community needs and to the growth of the social wellbeing.  
 
The objective should be not only to show the degree of efficiency of cooperative and 
social enterprises, but also to verify  in what contexts such enterprises  prove more 
efficient and effective than other organisational forms. Attention should therefore be 
devoted  not  only  to  the  strengths,  but  also  to  the  limitations  and  weaknesses  of 
cooperative and social enterprises. Empirical research should try to investigate from a 
critical  perspective  the  functioning  and  the  objectives  of  these  organisations,  their 
governance  structures  and  their  managerial  practices,  and  their  transaction  and 
governance  costs,  beyond  the  costs  of  the  resources  and  technologies  used.  The 
analysis  of  the  inside  dynamics  would  also  allow  for  offering  suggestions  to 
practitioners  for  improving  the  management  of  not-for-profit  organisations,  to  the 
political arena in terms of policy implications, and to researchers who want to develop 
the analysis further. These efforts will allow the accomplishment of a complete picture, 
and the development of a new theoretical approach represents the framework for this 
picture. 
 
As a conclusion and suggestion to scientists, the preliminary analysis of the role of 
cooperatives and social enterprises introduced in this paper underlines the need for 
more  research  and  understanding  of  these  organisations.  As  regards  theory,  an 
analytical approach is needed which disregards how these organisations are regulated 
in  different  countries  and  privileges  identification  and  analysis  of  their  key 
characteristics,  thereby  enabling  critical  assessment  of  the  adequacy  and 
shortcomings  of  current  regulations,  and  then  proposes  changes  that  may  enable 
them to operate more efficiently and effectively in different social contexts. As said, 
however,  the  identification  of  the  common  features  of  cooperative  and  social 
enterprises will not impede differentiation in their organisational models and working 
rules  at  the  local  and  national  level,  given  the  different  cultural,  social,  and 
institutional conditions (Ostrom, 1994). Theoretical and empirical research must be 
implemented  both  in  specific  settings  and  in  comparative  terms.  Theoretical 
developments, laboratory experiments, case studies and empirical tests may be the  
best  way  in  which  to  obtain  these  results.  Furthermore,  a  multi-disciplinary 
perspective  must  be  adopted  by  promoting  and  undertaking  research  in  various 
scientific  domains—from  sociology  to  law,  from  economics  to  psychology—and  by 
encouraging  comparison  and  exchange  among  different  disciplines,  above  all  those 
with interpretative purposes and those concerned with the regulation of cooperative 
and social enterprises, their activities, and their relations with other actors.  
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